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RES GESTAE AND THE EXCITED UTTERANCE:
AN EXPLANATION OF THE KENTUCKY
APPROACH
It is a widely accepted rule of evidence that both hearsay
and nonhearsay statements are admissible into evidence
through the broad concept of res gestae. 1 One area of difficulty
under this rule, however, is the confusion surrounding nonhearsay verbal acts and the hearsay exception for excited utterances. 2 Many courts have used the res gestae concept to
describe both of these distinct evidentiary principles, thereby
creating uncertainty as to the elements necessary to admit each
type of statement.'
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has not been immune
from this problem. In the 1964 case of Hemphill v.
Commonwealth,4 the Court held that only the statements of
actors in an event are admissible under the excited utterance
hearsay exception. The statements of bystanders were totally
excluded from the scope of the exception. However, as will be
more fully developed below, the requirement that the declarant
be an actor is properly applied only to a verbal act. The Court's
error in Hemphill can be traced to its reliance on Louisville
Railway Co. v. Johnson's Administrator,5 a case which ruled
that statements of bystanders could not be admitted under the
res gestae doctrine.
In an attempt to resolve the confusion, the Court of Appeals held in Preston v. Commonwealth' that it is unnecessary
to determine whether the declarant is an actor or a bystander

I

Res gestae is defined literally as a "matter incidental to the main part and
explanatory of it." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1469 (4th ed. 1968).
2 See 6 J. WoGmoRo,
EVIDENCE § 1755 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMORE].

3 Keefe v. State, 72 P.2d 425, 427 (Ariz. 1937), in which the court stated: "It is
generally due to a confusion of these two classes of evidence and the principles governing their admissibility that the conflict between the many apparently irreconcilable
decisions has arisen."
1 379 S.W.2d 223 (Ky. 1964), cited erroneously in 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 723
(1967) as a case allowing the admission of bystanders' statements under the excited
utterance exception.
5 115 S.W. 207 (Ky. 1909).
6 406 S.W.2d 398 (Ky. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 920 (1967).
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in order to admit his statement under the excited utterance
exception. 7 The Preston holding would have sufficiently clarified this area of evidence law had the Court not expressly declined to overrule Hemphill, qualifying its decision with the
notation "See, however, Hemphill v. Commonwealth." 8 Thus,
although recent cases have followed the Preston rationale, the
express reference to the Hemphill decision may breed uncertainty.
The ambiguity inherent in Preston and the potential for
misinterpretation by the practicing attorney necessitate an
examination of the proper application of both the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule and the verbal act doctrine.
Such an examination must begin with an understanding of the
requirements and rationale of each principle.
I.

THE EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION

An excited utterance is a spontaneous extrajudicial statement introduced in court as true. Although such a statement
is hearsay, it has long been recognized9 that excited utterances
have special reliability due to the suspension of the declarant's
powers of reflection and fabrication through excitement. 0 Consequently, the courts have created an exception to the hearsay
rule for these spontaneous statements."
The basic test of an excited utterance is whether, under
the facts and circumstances of the case, the declarant's statement is an accurate reflection of the facts concerning the act
or event in question as he perceives them without resort to
recollection or interpretation. 2 In order for a statement to pass
Id. at 401.
"Id.
The excited utterance exception dates back at least to the seventeenth century
case of Thompson v. Trevanion, 90 Eng. Rep. 179 (N.P. 1694). In this action for assault
and battery, the utterances of the victim made immediately upon sustaining the injury
and before she had time to contrive anything for her own advantage were admitted in
evidence despite their hearsay nature.
C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 764 (2d ed. 1972).
Hughes, Misapplicationof the Res Gestae Doctrine, 2 AM. LAW. S.REv. 541, 542
(1911).
1 Commonwealth v. Van Horn, 41 A. 469 (Pa. 1898). See also Thayer,
Bedingfield's Case-Declarationsas a Partof the Res Gestae, 15 AM. L. REV. 71 (1881).
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this test, the following elements must be present: 1) a startling
occurrence which produces nervous excitement sufficient to
render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; 2) an utterance made while so under the influence of such excitement that
fabrication is precluded; and 3) an utterance that relates to the
occurrence." Any statement meeting these criteria should be
admitted as an excited utterance unless the declarant's opportunity to personally observe the occurrence is adequately impeached.4
The Kentucky Court of Appeals commonly relies upon the
broad concept of res gestae in admitting spontaneous declarations into evidence. Nevertheless, the rationale of the excited
utterance exception is sufficiently revealed in the cases to support the conclusion that the exception has been accepted by the
Court.
An early Kentucky case applying the excited utterance
exception was McLeod v. Ginther's Administrator,5 in which
the plaintiff brought an action to recover for the wrongful death
of her husband in a collision allegedly caused by the negligence
of the defendant railroad in sending conflicting dispatches to
the conductors of two trains which were to run over the same
track on the same day. A statement made by the defendant's
conductor a few seconds after the accident claiming that he
had received a dispatch authorizing his use of the track was
held admissible as part of the res gestae. The Court justified
admission of the statement, despite its hearsay nature, by explaining that the declarant "had no time to contrive or devise
a falsehood by which to exonerate himself from blame, and his
declaration was so connected with the circumstances then surrounding him, and which form a part of [the] case" as to be
admissible under the res gestae exception." Although it classified the statement as part of the res gestae, the Court's language and requirement of contemporaneity clearly indicate an
acceptance of the excited utterance exception.
Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Earl'sAdministrator7 repre6 WIGMORE § 1750.
,4See, e. g., Towne v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 70 P.2d 364 (Idaho 1937).

50 Ky. 399 (1882).
" Id. at 405.
1794 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. 1936).
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sented Kentucky's acceptance of the excited utterance exception in the form recognized in the majority of jurisdictions. 8
The Court abandoned contemporaneity as a requirement, interpreting it as merely an index of the determinative element-spontaneity. 19
From the foregoing discussion, it is safe to conclude that
the Kentucky Court of Appeals has adopted the excited utterance exception and that spontaneity is the primary prerequisite to admission under the exception. It logically follows that
no distinction should be made between the excited utterances
of participants in an event and those of bystanders, as long as
the requisite "special reliability" is provided by the presence
of spontaneity. However, prior to Preston," Kentucky chose to
make just such a distinction.
II.

THE VERBAL ACT DOCTRINE

It is an accepted proposition that the hearsay rule is not
applicable to various types of utterances which are proven as
operative facts. 2' The verbal act doctrine encompasses statements made by an actor which are admissible in evidence to
explain an independent and ambiguous act. Thus, when a witness testifies to statements uttered by an actor, and such testimony is offered solely for the purpose of explaining the actor's
22
equivocal conduct, it is not deemed to be hearsay evidence.
The test of whether a declaration is admissible under the
verbal act doctrine requires that four elements coexist: 1) there
must be a main or principal act relevant to the issue, the significance of which needs to be made more definite; 2) the words
must explain the character of the act; 3) the statement must
be made by the actor himself; and 4) the words must be precisely contemporaneous with the act.2 As an illustration of the
verbal act doctrine, consider A marking through one clause of
",

"

See C. CHAMBERLAYNE, EVIDENCE § 838 (1919).
Sparks Busline, Inc. v. Spears, 124 S.W.2d 1031 (Ky. 1939).

20 406
21

S.W.2d 398 (Ky. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 920 (1967).
Morgan, A Suggested Classificationof UtterancesAdmissible as Res Gestae, 31

YALE L.J. 229 (1922).

6 WIGMORE § 1752.
6 WIGMORE §§ 1773-76.

1072

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63

his will and stating that he wants the bequest or devise to now
descend to his heirs. B, who heard A make the statement, is
permitted to testify concerning A's statement. The purpose of
B's testimony is not to prove the truth of A's statement but to
explain the stated purpose in A's equivocal act of changing the
1
will.24

That the verbal act concept has long been recognized and
applied by the Kentucky Court of Appeals is indicated by the
1870 case of Howk v. McManama.21 In an action on a note

which the defendant denied making, the plaintiff's statement
that he intended to settle with the defendant even if he had to
take his note and sue on it was held admissible. In explanation
of its holding, the Court remarked: "Declarations made at the
time of the transaction, and expressive of its character, motive
or object, are regarded as 'verbal acts' indicating a present
purpose and intention, and are therefore admitted in proof like
any other material facts. ' 2 The Court obviously recognized the
proper limitations on the verbal act doctrine and realized that
statements coming within its purview are not exceptions to the
hearsay rule.
The basic rationale of Howk has remained virtually unchanged throughout its application by the Kentucky Court of
Appeals, although the Court has characterized verbal acts in
particular cases as "part of the res gestae." However, the
Court was perhaps using the term in its generic sense,28 rather
29
than referring to an exception to the hearsay rule.
The preceding analyses of the verbal act doctrine and the
excited utterance exception reveal three clear distinctions be2 For a precise statement of the principle, see Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Mosley, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 397, 411 (1869) (dissenting opinion).
4 Ky. Opin. 234 (1870).

26 Id. at 235, citing 1 S. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 10 (11th ed. 1863).
27 See, e.g., Barrett's Adm'r v. Brand, 201 S.W. 331 (Ky. 1918); Owensboro City

Ry. v. Rowland, 153 S.W. 206 (Ky. 1913).
" As indicated in note 1, supra, "res gestae" literally means "matter incidental
to the main part and explanatory of it." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1469 (4th ed. 1968).
29 See, e.g., Kentucky & W. Va. Power Co. v. Brown's Adm'r, 135 S.W.2d 70 (Ky.
1939) (statement of deceased as he touched a wire); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. McDonald, 39 S.W.2d 253 (Ky. 1931) (statement of conductor as deceased handed him a piece
of paper); Weil v. Silverstone, 69 Ky. (6 Bush) 698 (1869) (declarations by a buyer
relative to and contemporaneous with his act of removing goods).
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tween the two principles. First, an excited utterance must be
precipitated by an exciting event, whereas a verbal act may
accompany and explain any equivocal act. Secondly, an excited utterance must be uttered without deliberation or reflection. A verbal act must be deliberate. Finally, the declarant of
a verbal act must be a participant in the event. Any observer
of an event may make an excited utterance. 0

III.

THE AMBIGUITY IN KENTUCKY

As has been demonstrated, for many years the Kentucky
Court of Appeals has approved and employed the rationale of
the verbal act doctrine as well as that of the excited utterance
exception, albeit under the guise of res gestae. Nevertheless,
under the Court's approach to these principles, the excited
utterances of bystanders were excluded from evidence prior to
Preston v. Commonwealth.' In Preston the Court held that
"[the] nervous excitement which renders an utterance admissible may exist equally for a mere bystander as well as for the
injured or injuring person, and therefore the utterances of ei12
ther, concerning what they observed, are equally admissible.
Had the Court stopped at this point, there would be no doubt
as to the state of the law concerning excited utterances. The
Court, however, added the notation, "See, however, Hemphill
v. Commonwealth." 33 The holding of Hemphill is in direct
conflict with Preston. Why did the Court not overrule Hemphill instead of placing this curious notation in Preston?In order
to answer this question, the reasoning behind the Hemphill
decision must be examined.
Hemphill was merely a reaffirmation of the Court's earlier
34
opinion in Louisville Railway Co. v. Johnson'sAdministrator.
In the latter case, the plaintiff administrator brought an action
against the defendant railway company for a wrongful death
" Note, Res Gestaein Virginia, 21 VA. L. REV. 725 (1935). Although the distinction
concerning the bystander is still somewhat unclear in a few jurisdictions, a logical
analysis of the divergent theories supports the distinction.
31406 S.W.2d 398 (Ky. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 920 (1967).
22 Id. at 401, citing 6 WIGMORE § 1755.
33 Id.
3, 115 S.W. 207 (Ky. 1909).
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allegedly caused by the failure of the defendant's agents to see
the victim on the track. The plaintiff sought to introduce the
statement of the defendant's conductor admonishing the engineer to say nothing about the accident. The Court of Appeals
reasoned that, because the conductor had no part in causing
the accident, he was merely a bystander, and that the admission of bystanders' statements would "open wide the door for
the admission of reckless or thoughtless or ill-considered exclamations. '35 In explaining its theory for excluding the evidence,
the Court noted:

[The rule in this state is that declarations ... to be admissible as part of the res gestae must be made by one of the
actors in the affair, contemporaneous in point of time with
the principal transaction under consideration, be made at or
near the place of its occurrence, and illustrate or explain how
or what caused it to happen. . . .[If made] by a bystander
or third party, the declaration is not admissible
as substan31
tive evidence or as part of the res gestae.
The Court's statement of theory is an excellent exposition
of the verbal act doctrine. The Court's test for admission requires a contemporaneous statement by an actor to explain the
character of an equivocal act. These factors are exactly those
required for a verbal act. The difficulty with the Johnson decision is that the statement concerned is an excited utterance,
not a verbal act. The conductor's statement easily passes the
excited utterance test. It is a spontaneous statement relating
to a startling occurrence made while under the influence of the
excitement generated by the occurrence. The Court's concern
about "thoughtless or ill-considered exclamations" confirms
this categorization. It is precisely this characteristic which accords the statement its special reliability.37 Thus, the Court
obviously applied the limitations and rationale of the verbal
act doctrine to an excited utterance.

'

Id. at 210.
Id. at 209, citing 1 S. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 107 (11th ed. 1863); accord, 1 B.

ELLIOT & W. ELLIOT, EVIDENCE § 542 (1942).

11See, e.g., PROPOSED FED. R. Evm. 803(b), Advisory Comm. Notes at 115 (1973);
Slough, Spontaneous Statements and State of Mind, 46 IOWA L. REV. 224, 242 n.88
(1961).
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Through its total reliance upon Johnson, the Court of Appeals perpetuated its error in Hemphill. It appears that the
primary source of this mistake was the Court's usage of the
broad term res gestae, which lacks the exactitude necessary to
delineate specific evidentiary principles and therefore creates
confusion.
The Prestondecision was a proper exposition and application of the excited utterance exception. In view of the Court's
obvious recognition of the proper scope of the exception, the
only apparent explanation for the Hemphill caveat in the opinion is that the Court intended to cite a proper description of
the verbal act doctrine and warn that bystanders' statements
cannot be admitted as verbal acts. The Court's decisions subsequent to Preston appear to support this contention. In Jett v.
Commonwealth," the Court admitted the contents of a telephone call made to a sheriff by a rape witness. In Wilson v.
Commonwealth," a bystander's statement to the perpetrator of
a crime was admitted. Following the Preston rationale even
more closely, Roland v. Beckham made no attempt to categorize the declarant as an actor or bystander. This decision simply emphasized that the statement of a bus driver placing the
blame for the accident on the other driver was spontaneous and
related to the event. Each of these cases involved excited utterances and in none of the cases was the Hemphill verbal act
limitation applied. These opinions clearly indicate that the
Court of Appeals now correctly applies the hearsay exception
for excited utterances to admit the statements of bystanders as
well as those of participants in an event.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The verbal act doctrine and the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule are two separate evidentiary principles
which, despite their differing requirements and limitations,
have often been confused through use of the broad res gestae
concept. The Kentucky Court of Appeals sought to eliminate
- 436 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1969).
3' 492 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1973).
40408 S.W.2d 628 (Ky. 1966).
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this confusion in Preston v. Commonwealth4 but instead created additional uncertainty by referring to, but failing to over42
rule, the conflicting decision of Hemphill v. Commonwealth.
The reasoning behind Hemphill and the cases subsequent
to Preston allow the conclusion that the Court's caveat in
Preston was merely intended to serve warning that the statements of bystanders are not within the verbal act doctrine. The
ambiguity inherent in this warning is dissipated if Preston is
treated as an excited utterance case and Hemphill is interpreted as a proper statement of the verbal act doctrine. In order
to insure precision and clarity in the future, it is suggested that
the Court of Appeals abandon all use of the overly broad term
"res gestae."
Henry L. Stephens
1 406 S.W.2d 398 (Ky. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 920 (1967).
379 S.W.2d 223 (Ky. 1964).
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